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But Walker Lake's death throes have not gone unnoticed. For2 over a century,
fierce political and court battles have been waged over the lake. " After years of
fighting, a Nevada court issued a decree that allocated water for hundreds of private
to a prior appropriation
water users.2" Nevada, like most western states, adheres
2
system: individuals can hold a private interest in water. This system was bome out
of the necessity of the western expansion, when water literally meant the difference
23
between life and death.
these private users-but it
The Walker Lake decree set aside plenty of water for
24
public.
the
all:
of
wrote out the biggest interest holders
See, we citizens have an interest in Walker Lake too, just as we have an interest
in other natural waterbodies. That interest has been recognized since ancient Roman
26
25
law-and consistently since. French law recognized it in the eleventh century,
27
and Spanish law in the thirteenth. Early English law recognized it, and the U.S. law
28
confirmed this
recognizes it today. Even Nevada's own3°Supreme Court has long
31
29
as far as the
But
statutes.
its
does
public interest. As does its Constitution. As
not have
well
as
might
interest
public
the
Walker Lake decree was concerned,
it said
but
lake,
the
use
to
rights
municipal
and
existed. The decree settled private
32
itself.
lake
the
protecting
in
interest
nothing about the public's
Our public interest stems from our original sovereign contract with3 3 the
So
government: we gave states our rights and interests in water, to hold in trust.
the
unharmed,
long as that fundamental public interest in water remains
government's trust duties remain satisfied. This principle has come to be known as
34
public's important
the public trust doctrine. It says that the government holds theabdicate
its duties. 35
cannot
trustee,
any
like
them-and,
for
water resources in trust
20 See Mineral Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 900 F.3d 1027, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2018).
21 Id. at 1029.
22 Id. at 1029, 1029 n.2.
AND
23 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
PUBLIC POLICY 129 (7th ed. 2009).
24 The defending parties argue that the public interest is actually considered because Nevada law

of interest than the
requires water to be put to a "beneficial use," but beneficial use is a different sort
& Scott S.
public trust protects. See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1034, n.7; see also Russell M. McGlothlin

of Balanced Water
Slater, No Fictions Required. Assessing the Public Trust Doctrine in Pursuit

and beneficial
Management, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 53, 74-77 (2013) (comparing public trust duties
"factor" is not
use principles). Not to mention that, as we will see, merely considering a public interest
enough. See infra Parts IV-V.
25 See infra Section III.A.
26 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
ENVTL. L. 425, 429 n.22 (1989).
Scope
27 of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19
Id. at429 n.21.
Generalas the Guardian
2 Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney

L. & POL'Y F. 57, 64-75 (2005).
of the State's NaturalResources, 16 DUKE ENVTL.Lawrence
v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606 (2011)).
29 See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1031 (citing
30 id.
31 id.
32
See id. at 1029-30.
33 See infra Sections Ill.A, IV.B.
14 See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1030, n.3.
3

5See infra Part I.
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The tiny county harboring Walker Lake, Mineral County, seized on this doctrine
and moved to intervene in a Nevada case to modify the Walker Lake decree.3 6
Mineral County argued that the State of Nevada must protect the public's basic
interest in keeping Walker Lake alive.37 By not doing so, the state was violating its
trust obligations. The case meandered its way up to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.38
The court recognized that the public does indeed have an interest in the lake and
that the public trust doctrine protects it, but the panel was unable to decide whether
Nevada law allowed that public interest to trump the rights of the hundreds of private
water users who had been given water permits under the decree (and if so, whether
Nevada would have to pay for taking this "property"). 39 That question is now
certified to the Nevada Supreme Court.4 °
The Mineral County v. Walker River IrrigationDistricfl case tees up questions
that have remained only partially answered across the nation: what role does the
public trust theory play in state water management? Can Nevada effectively abdicate
its public trust duties over Walker Lake by deciding that the existing private water
permits trump the need to save the lake and its ecology? And who decides: the
judiciary, or instead, the legislature and agency water managers? Perhaps most
importantly, if the state declines to recognize its public trust duties, what can the
federal courts do about it, if anything?
It turns out that courts largely view the public trust doctrine as limited by state
legislative and executive policy. 4 According to this widespread theory, states may
be required to hold in trust a handful of historically big waterbodies (referred to as
"navigable" waters) for certain uses like commerce, but beyond that, states are
free
to dispose of water without substantial impairment of the public's interests. 43 So
there is no requirement that states consider, for example, the public's interest in
conserving Walker Lake, a lake much older than the state of Nevada. And not only
can the public not meaningfully challenge a state's legislative or executive decisions
in state courts-they can't challenge the state's abdication of the public trust in
federal court either, because the scope of the trust is supposedly a state law matter.'
Courts and litigants have struggled to craft a theory that will allow the state's
trust duties to extend to more water and more uses and, perhaps most importantly,
be enforceable in both state and federal courts. I suggest such a theory here.

36 See Mineral Cty.,

900 F.3d at 1030.

371id

38id.

39

1d. at 1030-34.

40 Id. at 1034-35.
41See generally id.
42
See, e.g., Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine:
What it is, Where
it Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (and Should Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV.

47, 80-81, 94 (2012) (discussing legislative action and "limitations I] imposed by legislation,
administrative action, constitutional amendment, or judicial decision").
41 See id at 50-52, 70-71 (criticizing the few states, like California, who have seriously
expanded
public trust protections because this expansion is out of step with historical notions about the public trust).
" See id. at 49-50 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012)).
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In short, this article explains why we should view the public trust doctrine as
reflecting very basic principles of limited state authority over water. This limitation
prevents states from seriously infringing on the public's interest in all flowing water.
In other words: when states (and occasionally the federal government) abdicate their
public trust duties, they are permitting an infringement on the public's fundamental
right to water-a violation of due process and a violation of the states' sovereign
authority.
45
This article proceeds in several steps, but each is meant to float one realization
dynamic threats to the public's interest in
the
to the surface: There is a link between
into trust and protect them. A state's
waters
take
to
water and the state's obligation
borders depends on the threats those
its
within
water
of
dispose
to
sovereign authority
is evident in the evolution of the
link
this
see,
will
we
as
indeed,
And
face.
waters
public trust doctrine in the United States and long before. In the past, the threats to
water were narrow, and so the public trust doctrine imposed duties on a narrow set
of those historically big, navigable waterways. But as threats to water have grown,
so have the states' obligation to take waters into trust.
This theoretical framework allows federal courts to review a state's decision to
forego its trust duties, even when it needs to go beyond those historical, navigable
waters. After all, viewed this way, enforcing the public trust is a remedy to protect
the public's interest in natural waters generally. Not only should litigants be able to
argue for an expansion of trust duties in state courts under state constitutions, they
should also be able to argue for this expansion in federal courts under the U.S.
Constitution.
Interpreting which waters and uses are protected by the trust is, in effect,
interpreting the extent of sovereign authority over water. That is a job uniquely for
the judiciary. The court doors should thus be flung wide open in even the most
restrictive of states, allowing citizens to challenge legislative and administrative
decisions about water allocation. Courts will be empowered to expand the public
trust even in the face of legislative and administrative obstinance.
This article proceeds in five steps. First, we will take a public trust bootcamp so
that you can understand the basic outlines of the doctrine. Second, we look at why a
new view of the doctrine is needed on the ground. This includes a review of the
pressing water crises that our nation faces, especially with climate change draining
the little water we have. This part also lays out the gaps in current water management
schemes and, most importantly, the gaps in the public trust that stymie the doctrine
from doing more to help.
Third, we will examine the public trust doctrine's source and nature. This is
important because the doctrine's origins and contours will implicate what guiding
principles we should use when interpreting it today. This part makes several
conclusions, including that (1) the doctrine derives from an ancient social contract
" The public trust doctrine is nuanced and complex, spawning a plethora of law review articles. E.g.,
DUKE
James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18
flood of
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 3 (2007) (noting that the doctrine has been the subject of a "raging
academic commentary"); Ivan M. Stoner, Leading a Judge to Water: In Search of a More Fully Formed
"the froth that the
Washington Public Trust Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REv. 391, 391, 423 (2010) (noting
public doctrine has generated among academics").
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wherein the public entrusted all natural water resources to the government, (2) the
doctrine is about protecting these public resources from state waste or abdication of
its trust duties, and (3) the doctrine, as a limitation on state authority, is best viewed
as constitutional in nature-specifically, at home in the Due Process Clause. 46 This
clause makes the most sense for several reasons, including because the trust doctrine
is about protecting concrete rights in water from government harm.
Finally, the payoff: this article concludes that courts should be empowered to
interpret both the reach and force of the public trust doctrine. When states privatize
waters and cause the public interest to be harmed, the states have exceeded their
constitutional and sovereign authority. Interpreting the bounds of that authority is at
the heart of judicial function. That means that courts must be empowered to extend
the reach of the public trust to new waters and new uses to adequately redress those
public harms.
The article finishes by cataloguing the many advantages of this approach. Not
only will the gaps in state adoption of the public trust be filled based on local and
adaptive needs, but legislative failure will be shored up.
I. A PUBLIC TRUST

BOOTCAMP

As many scholars have discussed at length, the public trust doctrine's roots are
deep, extending through early America, English common law, thirteenth century
Spain, eleventh century France, and all the way back to early Roman law.47 The basic
idea is that water is so essential to all mankind48 that everyone should be allowed to
freely enjoy it, like the air we breathe.49 Indeed, because water is so important, it's
better viewed as a fundamental right of the people rather than a fungible good owned

46 Others have suggested a constitutional home for the public trust doctrine-as well as urged
states
to incorporate broader public trust protections for waters. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen,
The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1450-51; Carol Necole Brown, Drinkingfrom
a
Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrineand Western WaterLaw, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1,2-13, 17 (2006).
This 47article attempts to build on this work.
See, e.g., Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding
Property Rights
andthe Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 348-52, 365-66 (2006); Wilkinson, supra note 26,
at
428-31 (tracing the roots of the public trust doctrine to thirteenth century Spain, eleventh century France,
the Qin dynasty 200 years before Christ, and beyond); see also MAGNA CARTA ch. 33 (1215); J. INST.

2.1.1; SIR MATrHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND,
IN THREE

PARTS 8-9, 11 (1787); Noah D. Hall & Joseph Regalia, Interstate Groundwater Law
Revisited- Mississippi v. Tennessee, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 166-86 (2016).
48
j. INST. 2.1.1.
49 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252-56
(D. Or. 2016) (discussing the trust
theory of the doctrine).
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of the "commons" that no
by governments.5 ° Water, in other words, is a property
5
own.
their
for
take
can
single landowner or sovereign
That's where the trust part comes in. The theory is that sovereigns do not own
water; instead, they are its trustees-protecting this precious resource for water's
52
true beneficiaries: the state's citizens. It's rather similar to any other fundamental
53
right that governments protect on behalf of the public (more on that later). Even the
U.S. Supreme Court has supported the force of this limitation on the government's
relationship with water, explaining that "[t]he control of the State for the purposes
of the trust can never be lost," except when "promoting the interests of the public"
substantial impairment of the
or when privatizing the water will not inflict "any
54
remaining."
waters
and
lands
the
in
interest
public
The public trust has come to be seen as both a limiting and empowering legal
principle.55 The trust imposes obligations on the sovereign, but at the same time, it
even if doing so
also empowers sovereigns to take steps to protect water resources,
56
rights).
water
will conflict with some other interests (like private
The public trust doctrine has nearly always been concerned with state duties and
powers over water.57 Practically, there are two aspects of the doctrine that are worth
covering at the outset: First, which state waters are covered by the trust, and second,
what water uses must states protect?

" See id; see also 11.Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) ("[O]wnership of the
the whole
navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to
be alienated
people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot
Joseph
.... ");Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 721,727 (Cal. 1983);
68 MiCH.L.
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention,
REv. 471,478-85 (1970).
"' See HALE, supra note 47 at 8-9; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,445-56
(Haw. 2000) (applying public trust obligations to a state agency).
52 Sax, supra note 50, at 483, 485-86; see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
public right to use
RESOURCES § 8:4 (2005) ("Public ownership of submerged beds is the source of the
waters.").
overlying
the
53See infra Part IV; see also Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (addressing substantive due process
rights to water as impacted by climate change).
4Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (applying limitations on state power).
441 U.S.
" See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma,
of the
322 (1979) ("[I]t is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject
Permit
Use
Water
re
In
State.");
the
of
people
the
to
future
the
in
use
beneficial
its
trust and secure
Applications, 9 P.3d at 453 ("Under the public trust, the state has both the authority and duty to preserve
the rights of present and future generations in the waters of the state.").
56See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1344 (Haw. 1973).
57There is some debate about whether the public trust stems from federal or state law, and we will
trust
take a look at that question later. And the federal courts have variously recognized some federal
issues. But the public trust has practically been applied mostly to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court
576,
has described the doctrine as a matter of state law. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S.
603-04 (2012). So we will stick to the application to states for now.
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Early U.S. cases, like English decisions that came before, extended the public
trust to a relatively narrow set of "navigable,"58 major waterways within each state.5 9
Think the Mississippi and major ocean-touching ports. 60 Cases often connected a
state's public trust duties with language about ownership.6' Courts reasoned that
states took ownership of the beds of certain major waterways when they joined the
union--and this ownership came with an attendant trust duty over the surface
62
waters.
But as I explored in a prior article, the idea that states "owned" the water itself
quickly proved to be a legal fiction.63 Instead, as will be explained below, courts
were wrangling with two separate questions: (1) What lands do states own?
and (2) Which waters should states be protecting?' 4 Suffice it to say for now that
these navigable waterways triggered the sovereign's public trust duties;
non-navigable waters, according to these early courts, did not-water in those bodies
could be owned or used up. 6" Likewise, early decisions required states to protect only
a few public uses of water: navigation, commerce, and fishing. 6"
As we will see later in this article, the contours of the public trust doctrine have
evolved a lot on both of these points, especially in recent decades.67 In terms of which
waters are covered, for example, many states have expanded the scope of which
waters trigger trust obligations to include smaller waterbodies or even all the water
within their borders-labeling these waters as "navigable" for purposes of the public
68
trust doctrine.
The evolution of the doctrine is complicated, in part, because U.S. water law
fractured into two loose systems in the 1800s: existing riparian water law on the east
5

8The definition of"navigable waters" varies depending on the legal context in water law.
"Navigable
waters" reach different waters for: (1) state title purposes; (2) the federal Commerce
Clause power;
(3) federal jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act; (4) federal jurisdiction under
the Rivers and
Harbors Act; and (5) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See JOSEPH J. KALO
ET AL., COASTAL AND
OCEAN LAW 4, 16-21, 117-18, 134-38 (3d ed. 2007).

59 See Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and
Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don 't Hold
Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.

511,567-75
(1975).
6
0See id. at 569-75; Indeed, in England, navigable waterways for purposes of
the trust included only
water affected by the tide. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust: An Historical

Analysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 48, 68 (1976).
61 See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,

26-28 (1894)); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 1, 14 (1935); Martin v. Waddell's
Lessee, 41 U.S.
367, 381, 410, 416-17 (1842).
62See Utah v. UnitedStates, 403 U.S. at 10; United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. at 14.

63Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 166-67, 181 n.223, 183.

64See infra Section V.
61 See infra Section V. The evolution of navigability for purposes of public
trust is discussed more below.

66 See DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., COASTAL STATES ORG.,
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO

WORK 6, 12 (2d ed. 1997); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894)
(emphasizing the public
rights of fishing and navigation).
67See infra Section IV.
66 Michael Blumm offers an excellent explanation of the state-title public
trust and the sovereign
public trust, pointing out that both exist. See Michael C. Blumm & Courtney
Engel, Proprietaryand
Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinianand Hale to Lamprey
and Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2018).
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69
half of the nation and prior appropriation on the west. Riparian law ties water rights
to landownership and recognizes70 an egalitarian relationship between users: water is
essentially "common property.
The prior appropriation system is a first-in-time private resource management
law.71 Private
scheme, borne out of the western expansion and based on mining
uses. 72
beneficial
for
of water
parties can perfect a right to use a certain amount
"The basic rules of prior appropriation effectively lock in established water uses and
[W]ater rights last forever, and their
allow them to continue without change ....
'73
Most western states have
conditions.
changed
reflect
to
terms are rarely amended
perfecting private water
of
process
this
govern
to
scheme
created a permitting
75
74
rights. That is, with the exception of Colorado. Water is thus generally allocated
creation of schemes and executive execution of detailed
in these states by legislative
76
permitting processes.
are
The prior appropriation doctrine complicates the scope of which waters
Congress
1800s,
late
the
in
Back
obligations.
within the scope of the states' trust
states
subjected non-navigable waters to prior appropriation and gave western
waters
non-navigable
all
over
handed
it
words,
other
waters-in
control over those
77
to the states themselves. The general result of all this is that states (and the U.S.
Supreme Court) have recognized that western states may generally determine which
waters should be included in their trust-so long as states take trust ownership over
78
historically navigable waterways. 79 And the same goes for which public interests
trust.
the
under
should be protected
A sore spot for the public trust should also be mentioned at the outset: the prior
appropriation doctrine relies heavily on private rights to water, and these private
rights can conflict with a state's efforts to carry out its public trust obligations over
water.80 No one seriously disputes that private parties can secure a protectable right

69TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 23, at 43-133; see also William L. Andreen, The Evolving Contours
Use and the Protection
of Water Law in the United States: Bridging the Gap Between Water Rights, Land
ofthe Aquatic Environment, 23 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 5, 8-11 (2006).
70

at 8.
See Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,351,356 (1908); Andreen, supranote 69,

71 See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 23, at 121 33; see also Andreen, supra note 69, at 10.
72

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 711, 714 n.8 (Cal. 1983).

73 Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Consideringthe SimilaritiesBetween

51 (2004).
Western Water Law and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29,
74 TARLOCK ET AL., supranote 23, at 194-95.
71Id. at 194.
76
See id.
77See 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2018).
78 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603-04 (2012) (Justice Kennedy explaining
accepted principles of
that "the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law" and "[u]nder
over waters within
trust
public
the
of
scope
the
determine
to
power
residual
federalism, the States retain
doctrine"); see also
their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing
U.S. 589,612 (1945);
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
Act).
Land
Desert
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import
the
(confirming
(1937)
95-96
82,
U.S.
300
Ickes v. Fox,
79 See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 587-88, for an example of public interests affected by
unauthorized use of riverbeds.
711 (Cal. 1983);
0
See, e.g., id.; Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709,
1979).
(Mass.
357
356,
N.E.2d
393
Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth,
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to use water. 81 But, for example, it's quite common for a private use of
water-combining forces with other private uses or environmental factors-to
threaten important waterbodies subject to a state's trust obligations. 82 When private
rights to water interfere with waters subject to the public trust, states are in theory
required to step in and protect the trust waters. 83
But these conflicts have spawned contentious debate and diverging caselaw.84
Some courts view a state carrying out its trust obligations as a constitutional taking
when private rights are seriously harmed-a simple matter of a common law rule
(the public trust doctrine) butting up against citizens' constitutional property rights
(their prior appropriation water rights).85
But other courts view the state's trust obligation as a fundamental limitation
baked directly into private rights. 86 This view recognizes that the public has a
preexisting interest and right to water resources, and that when those rights are
threatened so much that they touch on waters subject to the public trust, private water
rights are qualified. 87 This view is much like the principle that rights that come with
owning land are qualified by the competing rights of others, like the right to be free
from nuisances.88
Another important feature of the public trust is that both members of the public
and the states themselves can sue under the doctrine. 89 States can sue to protect trust
resources under their parens patriate powers. 90 Members of the public
(who otherwise have standing) may sue the state for failing to comply with its trust
obligations over a particular body of water.91
There is much more that can be said about the public trust doctrine, but that
should do for now. 92 With the basics covered, let's dive deeper into what the doctrine
looks like today and where some of its shortcomings lie.

81See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 580 (offering support for the private right
to use water under

certain circumstances).

82See, e.g., Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711.
83 Id. at 732.
84

See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.09 (Amy K. Kelley
ed., 3d ed. 2019).

85Id. (describing this conflict and providing examples of cases in
several footnotes).
86
See id.
87See id.

88See Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defenses to Takings
Liabilityfor Sea
Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 401-03 (2011).
89Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (111. 1970) (utilizing the public trust
doctrine as
grounds for standing); Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States'
Exclusive
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use andAbuse, and the Possibilityof a Blue
Water Public
Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19 (2009) (describing the public trust doctrine
as presumptive
grounds for standing).
90See Turnipseed et al., supra note 89, at 18-19, 19 n.106.
91See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
92For example, the federal government has various conflicting and superior interests
in water that
can complicate trust principles. See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 156-58, 163-65 (1900);
Gibson
v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-76 (1897).
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A. We are in a water crisisand adaptive, aggressive action is needed to protect
precious water resources,especially in the west.
There is little dispute about the pressing need for governments to protect their
93
winnowing water resources. The western U.S. is facing the worst water crisis in
94
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a century.
more than
95
nation.
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97
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98
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°
crisis is faced by many other states.' And that includes not just the arid west, but
the east, too. 1'
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(2015).
409
409,
NATURE
524
Drought,
Anthropogenic
95 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT,
2007),
(Nov.
11
8,
POLICYMAKERS
FOR
SUMMARY
4
U.S.
[https'//pemaccS5EC-KB7W];
syrfullreportpdf
https.//www.ipcc.ch/sitelasse/loads/2018/02/ar
STATE
A
STATES:
UNrIED
THE
IN
IMPACT'S
CHANGE
CLIMATE
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL
c ts m ate- h
fs
npa
/ch
OF KNOWLEDGE REPORT 41 (2009), hups:/downloads.globalchange.govhsimpact/sId
already
is
climate change
reportpdf [httpsJ/pemn.cc/D5TY-9LFMI ("Evidence Is mounting that human-induced
when, where, how much, and
altering many of the existing patterns of precipitation in the United States, including
what kind of precipitation falls.").
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9' See id.
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99 Id.
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" See. e.g., FearedTrout Drop-off Signals Climate Shift in Montana, PBS NEWSHOUR

2008, 6:40
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montana [https://perma.cc/X2ST-G2WK].
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See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 95, at
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10 Id. at 41.
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I won't belabor the threats to water resources because so many other scholars
have done so, and better than I can." You might think that given these threats,
federal and state governments would be passing water management policy at every
legislative session, anything to avert the coming disaster. But no. There remain
glaring shortcomings in water management policy across the country, including stark
gaps in state adoption of public trust duties to protect water resources.
B. Many states have shed or cut theirpublic trust duties.
Following federal directives that states should decide the reach of their public
trust obligations (at least beyond the historical minimum), a patchwork of approaches
have developed. °5 This is not necessarily a bad thing: one of the advantages of the
public trust framework is that it is adaptive to local needs.'0 6
But one major problem stems from states that have narrowly confined or
abdicated their public trust duties altogether. This make some sense, given that the
prior appropriation doctrine, at its heart, favors private water users.' 0 7 Using up
water-indeed, using every drop of it up-is the goal in a pure prior appropriation
world: "[W]ater users perceived pumping a stream dry not merely as an allowed
outcome, but as a desired one."'0 8
States have cabined the reach of their public trust duties in terms of(1) the waters
covered, (2) the uses protected, and (3) the power of the trust obligations themselves.
Other scholars have done admirable jobs of sorting the precise contours of each
state's public trust doctrine, so I won't repeat all that here.' 0 9
In short, many states have narrowed the waters, uses, and impact of the public
trust doctrine to the basic scope described in a U.S. Supreme Court case from the
1800s, Illinois CentralRailroadCo. v. Illinois."' Major waterways and the trinity of
uses are protected, but not much more.' Some states have expanded the scope of
waters to include waterbodies capable of floating logs, or supporting certain sorts of
recreation, or to artificial and major waterways.' 1 2 But most states have maintained
a relatively narrow scope similar to the Illinois Centralstandard from the late 1800s,
"o See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust

Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37

ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56-57 (2010); Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine,

65 PLAN. & ENvTL. L. 7, 7 (2013).
105 Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role
of State Common-Law
Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 814 (2010).

06Id. at 785.
07Lawrence J. MacDonnell, EnvironmentalFlows in the Rocky Mountain West: A Progress
Report,
9 Wyo. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (2009).
108 Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine,
and the Administrative State, 45
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2012).
109 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 103, at 93-197.
"o Id. at 69-70, 93-197; see generally Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
.. See Craig, supra note 104, at 69-70, 93-197.
112See id. at 93-197; see also Craig, supra note 105, at 818-19; Joseph J. Kalo, "It'sNavigable in

Fact So I Can Fish in It": The Public Right to Use Man-Made, Navigable-in-Fact Waters
of Coastal

North Carolina, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2095, 2112-13 (2011) (noting that North Carolina courts
have
established that public trust principles extend to artificial waters).
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2006).
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in the Gulf of California for over fifty years because of over-appropriation-until
2014 when the federal government stepped in.124
The high-water mark for incorporation of the public trust in prior appropriation

systems in the West is California1 2 5 and Hawaii. 126 For example, in California,

"[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or otherwise public
waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or accustomed to resort
and through which they have the freedom of passage to and from the public fishing
grounds of the state." 1 7 Hawaii's trust is as expansive.128
But even in those states, the public trust is limited-not by the effect on public
interest in water, but by historic and legislative definitions of what waters the trust
attaches to. 129 So trust duties do not extend to some non-navigable waters or
groundwater. 30 Both of these states, like others, interpret the contours of the public
trust in the shadow of legislative intent. As one Hawaiian court explained, the trust
applies expansively only when the legislature has allowed it to:
The public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable

waters trust, has its genesis in the common law. ... The [State Water]

Code does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law
public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the legislature appears to have

engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code.13

Scholars seem to agree that to change the status quo, the legislature or executive
must step in and voluntarily agree to a new, more robust standard for water
32
management.
In the end, you may start to question how much the public trust really matters.
States that politically want to protect water resources have recognized a robust public
trust doctrine; states that prefer to protect private rights have limited the doctrine. 33
Presumably, these states could have legislated to achieve the same ends. Robin Craig,
in her authoritative guide to the public trust doctrine, explains this point:

member of the Colorado River Basin Roundtable) ("These are some of our biggest rivers in the state
and
they all but dry up.").
124Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado River Delta Turned Green After a Historic Water Pulse,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/colorado-riverdelta-tumed-green-after-historic-water-pulse- I 8 0953670/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/43PR-PW8X].
125See, e.g., State v. Super. Ct. of Placer Cty., 625 P.2d 256, 257-58 (Cal.
1981).
126See Craig, supra note 104, at 118, 122-24.
127
Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct App. 1989).
128See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson
v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
129
See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983)
(noting
the historical basis of the navigability doctrine).
130 Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 7
Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Golden Feather,257 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
131
In re Water, 9 P.3d at 442 (citations omitted).
132 See, e.g., Larry Myers, To Have Our Water and Use It Too: Why Colorado
Water Law Needs a
Public InterestStandard,87 U. COLO. L. REv. 1041, 1059 (2016) (opining that to incorporate public
trust
principles "would require, at a minimum, amending the Colorado Constitution").
1"3
Craig, supra note 104, at 71-72.
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public trust obligation. 46 And even in states with more robust versions of the
doctrine, the view that the public trust doctrine stems from legislative prerogative or
other historic or static precepts bogs the doctrine down in the courts.147
Problems like these likely derive from states' belief that the legislature and
executive branches have final say in interpreting the contours of the public trust.
They also stem from state courts feeling hamstrung by their legislatures and
executive branches, and no easy avenue open for federal review. We will return to
these topics soon.
C. These gaps in the state public trust compound the shortcomings
in water managementpolicy generally.
The water resource crisis is pressing. Scholars and researchers generally agree
that to meet these crises, the legal response must be aggressive and adaptive to local
48
needs. 1

At the outset, some suggest that public trust principles are already protected in
many states via statute or administrative process. To be sure, many states have
enacted statutes, water permitting schemes, and constitutional provisions that say
they favor public-trust-like principles. 49 But as explained in the prior section, these
directives have often remained disconnected from states' views about which waters
and which uses are shielded by the public trust doctrine. 5 ° In other words: states
trumpet public interests in water, but they don't necessarily extend public trust duties
as far as their proclamations would suggest.' 5'
There is also a big difference between the binding obligations of trust duties and
the open-ended mandates of positive law protections for the public interest. In other
words, we simply look at water subject to trust differently than we do water which
is not:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the
self-interest of private parties.152
Most courts view state proclamations of public interest in water akin to general
welfare language: a basis to challenge the state, if at all, only in the most extreme

'447 See Craig, supra note 104, at 101-02, 117-18.

1 See, e.g., Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884
(Cal. Ct App. 2003).
148See Craig, supra note 105, at 796-97.
149See CAL CONST. art. X, § 4 (codifying public tist doctrine); HAW. CONST.
art. Xl, §§ 1, 7; MONT. CONST.
art. IX § 3; PA. CONST. art I, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. XVIL § 1; WIS. CONST. art IX, § 1; CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE
§ 6307 (West 2005); Mic COMp. LAWS SERv. § 324.32501 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012); see also Hall
& Regalia,
supra note 47, at 166-86 (discussing various state proclamations of public water rights).
:50 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, 166-86.
'51See id.
152 Sax, supra note 50, at 490.
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ignoring the long-term nature of the rights protected by the public trust.' Carol Rose
has deftly explained the problems with legislative responses to water resource
of natural
problems: legislatures are vulnerable to the well-funded developers
60
some
when
say,
diffuse,"'
and
"large
is
resources--especially when opposition
rights
gain
groups
certain
When
public.'61
the
of
members
interests are held by future
play, which says that it is
to these resources, the "endowment effect" comes into
62
much harder to take away rights once they are given.' The value of the judiciary in
the water resources space starts to make some sense.
There is also a practical side to these legislative and executive shortcomings.
are way beyond what
Hope Babcock points out that "[t]he impacts of climate change
' 163
"a 'fundamental
And
have.'
laws
little adaptive capacity natural resources

in the West, 9
1' See Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 485, 486 nn.1-3 (2006).
'-4ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153(A) (2019).
155 See supratext accompanying note 119.
156
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (considering "conflicts with vested rights"); NEV. REV.
§ 533.370 (LexisNexis 2019) (considering "conflicts with existing rights").
ANN.
STAT.
157MONT. CODE. ANN. § 85-2-311 (2019).
not designed to protect
'5 Western state water codes and the agencies implementing them were simply
the public trust:
bodies
From the beginning, these were captured agencies in the fullest sense: publicly-funded
whose mission was to protect and promote a limited class of private rights. Despite
improvements in western water administration during the last decade or so, the interests that
created the agencies in the first place, and served as the agencies' sole constituency, had already
locked in well over a century of private uses.
Wilkinson, supra note 26, at 470.
59
Water Codes and
. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded
Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
"PublicInterest" Review Cannot Protectthe Public Trust in Western Water
283, 319-21 (2013).
161 Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson PrivateProperty,Public Rights, and the New Takings
Legislation,53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 294 (1996).
161See id. at 294-95.
62
1 Id. at 295.
163 Hope M. Babcock, Using the FederalPublic Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the Legal Systems
L. REV. 649, 667 (2017).
ProtectingMigrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB.
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re-envisioning' of environmental and natural resources law seems unlikely because
of the rigidity of the laws themselves, constraining all but the most modest of
expansions, and the low probability that Congress will enact new laws or even amend
old ones in the current political environment. '' "M
Robin Craig agrees, explaining that the "extent and severity of specific climate
change impacts in specific states and localities are likely to remain uncertain for
some time yet," and that adaptations will be required into the future.165 And perhaps
more important, there will often be a divergence of interests between political plans
for current future water needs and future interests in water-the holders of which
have no voice in the legislature.166
In short, positive law offers only so much help when it comes to water resources,
particularly given how much deference is paid to the states when it comes to water
management. 67 Private conservation is a drop in the bucket. 68
On top of that, as explained in the prior section, states have compounded the
problem by creating large gaps in water resource management, and state legislatures
and agencies that don't want to fill them are not voluntarily adopting a robust public
trust doctrine. 169 State legislatures and agencies are thus often not required to
consider wide-ranging current and future public interests in water when making
resource decisions. 7 ' Mary Christina Wood summed up the problem of failing to
include any sort of background limiting principle on state governments when it
comes to resource management: "Under the system of environmental statutory
laws ... over the past three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have
gained nearly unlimited authority to manage natural resources and allow their
destruction by private interests through permit systems."''
Courts-state and federal-have no alternative, adaptive legal doctrine to
address these concerns.

16'Id. at 667-68 (first quoting Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead"-Long
Live

Transformation:Five Principlesfor Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV.
ENVTL L. REv. 9, 30
(2010); then citing Todd S. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish
Environmental
Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.L. 35 (2014)).

"6'Craig, supra note 105, at 807.
16'
See generally id.

167See Jamison Colburn, Habitat Reserve Problem-Solving: Desperately Seeking
Sophisticated

Intermediaries,41 ENVTL. L. 619, 629 (2011) ("The major federal public lands systems and the
statutes
governing them have been shaped to fit other priorities, and the potential connectivity between
public
lands as habitat is, as a rule, very low."). The exception is the Clean Water Act, which is of limited
use.
Id.at 6625-26 n.38.
1 1 See Jessica Owley, The Increasing PrivatizationofEnvironmentalPermitting,
46 AKRON L. REV.

1091, 1113-15 (2013).

169See supra Section 1.B.

"' Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard
the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (PartI): Ecological Realism
and the Need for a

PardigmShift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 65-84 (2009).
171Id. at 44.
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III. THE SOURCE AND DEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST

A. The doctrine derivesfrom the public conferring to theirgovernment their
wholesale rights and interests in water-notfrom a notion of
government title or interest in commerce.
The public trust operates on the theory that citizens have entrustedsome of their
72
rights and interests in water to the government, usually the states, for safekeeping.
of fundamental constitutional
As explained later, this trust theory is emblematic
73
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Some have suggested that the public trust doctrine was intended to protect
75
as a byproduct of
commerce or travel.' Others have suggested it is best viewed
176
If either were so,
doctrine.
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the
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then limiting the
uses may make some sense. But the underpinnings of the public trust doctrine may
rights
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to flowing water, not some court-defined subset of
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have
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public-right principles as the basis of the doctrine.'

concurring) (found in
172See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 169 (1837) (Baldwin, J.,
all arms of the sea,
that
clear,
Baldwin's Constitutional Views, 134-69) (explaining that "[bly the common law, it is
is held on behalf
title
this
that
but
sovereign,"
the
of
property
the
are
flows,
and
ebbs
tide
the
coves, creeks, etc. where
v. Baltimore &
of U.S. citizens); St. Croix Waterway Ass'n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1999); Stockton
by the state, as they were
N.Y.R. Co., 32 F. 9, 19-20 (D.NJ. 1887) ("[A]fter the conquest, the said lands were held
for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, lightby the king, in trust
Dorado Irr. Dist v. State
houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce.") (emphasis added); El
v. Boldt, 958 So.2d 367,
Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 490-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Brannon
(N.C.Ct App. 2009).
372-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2007); Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 681 S.E.2d 819, 824
173See infra Section III.C.

174 See generally Osherenko, supra note 47.
175To be fair, early decisions often referred to the public trust doctrine in terms of navigation,
v. City of Chicago, 99
describing important waterways as "public highways." See, e.g., N. Transp. Co.
Inc. v. State ex rel.
Colberg,
1906);
(Ala.
453
452,
So.
42
U.S. 635, 643 44 (1878); Daniels v. Carney,
109 A. 864, 867 (Conn.
Dep't of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967); Town of Orange v. Resnick,
Shippers' Ass'n, 48 So.
1920); Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' &
Inc., 206 So. 2d 69, 71
L.,
0.
T.
v.
Wilcox
rel.
ex
State
navigation);
643, 644-45 (Fla. 1909) (discussing
Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co., 164 N.W. 413, 414 (Mich.
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Parsons v. E.I.
concurring)); Gaither v.
1917) (quoting Woodman v. Pitman, 10 A. 321, 327 (Me. 1887) (Haskell, J.,
N.E. 817, 819 (N.Y.
184
Hawkins,
v.
Macrum
1952);
(N.C.
691
680,
S.E.2d
70
Albemarle Hosp., Inc.,
Flexibility and
1933); see also Maureen E. Brady, Defining "Navigability": Balancing State-Court
PrivateRights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1431 (2015).
176 Kramerv. City of Lake Oswego, 395 P.3d. 592,604 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (suggesting an ownership
theory of public trust).
177
See J. INST. 2.1.1 (discussing the public's right to flowing water).
2016); Nat'l Audubon
"' See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252-53 (D. Or.
Firestone, Public
Jeremy
&
Noel
Lance
1983);
(Cal.
724
709,
P.2d
Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658
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The idea that public trust turns on state title to underlying beds has been largely
debunked. 17 9 Ownership of the corpus of water has never been given much shrift.' 80
And while courts have occasionally tethered the public trust to ownership of
underlying land-particularly in early America' 81 -courts and scholars have
consistently shied away from these ownership principles over the last century.' 82
Both state and federal courts have clarified that the public trust doctrine does not rely
on states owning certain land under the equal footing doctrine.' 83 Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court disconnected public trust duties from ownership as far back as the
late 1800s.' 84
As to the theory that the public trust is borne out of a concern about commerce
(which may suggest that the doctrine stems from federal law and the commerce
power, or a state version of those principles)--that theory does not bear out well
either.'8 5 Instead, as we will see shortly, commerce just happened to be the public
interest of the day, but that does not mean commerce is the definition of the public's
interest for all time. At bottom, the public trust doctrine arises out of a much more
fundamental public right and interest in flowing water itself.'8 6
Those principles begin at least with Roman law and the Code of Justinian.' 87
Many scholars have quoted and analyzed the relevant language at length, but the
consensus is that this is at least one of the earliest and foundational sources of the
public trust.'88 The Code stands for the proposition that "air, running water, the sea,
Trust Doctrine Implications of Electricity Production, 5 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 169,
189 (2015)
(noting that "[s]cholarly commentary" suggests the public trust serves to "basic public interests").
1'9 Indeed, this has long been the case. See SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES 11-13 (3d ed. 1911).
0 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 167-68.
'8
See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-11 (1842) (stating that states "hold
the
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them").
182See id. at 389-95 (tracing the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
water as property
in the context of state vs. state and state vs. federal water disputes, and concluding that the
ownership
theory has been firmly debunked); see also, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (recognizing that public trust is not necessarily connected to title).
183See, e.g., CorvallisSand,429 U.S. at 371 72; Martin, 41 U.S. at 389-95;
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 658 P.2d 709, 714 (1983).
184 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1896), overruled by Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979).
'" The Commerce Clause and other alternative are discussed more infra Section III.C.
186 See Bryant Walker Smith, Water as a Public Good: The Status of Water Under
the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 301 (2009) ("Today,
water is
unambiguously a public good. A survey of current domestic water laws identified forty-four
countries in
which significant water resources belong to the state, the nation, or the people; it identified
no countries
that disavowed such public ownership.").
187 Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 167-68.
...
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct of Alpine Cty., 658 P2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983); Mont Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Currn, 682 P2d 163, 167 (Mont 1984) ('he theory underlying this doctrine can be
traced from
Roman Law through Magna Carta to present day decisions."); State v. Cent Vt Ry., Inc., 571 A2d 1128,
1130 (Vt
1989) ("The public trist doctrine is an ancient one, having its roots in the Justinian Institutes of Roman
law.");
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) ('Tne principle that the public has an overriding
interest in
navigable waterways and lands under them is at least as old as the Code of Justinian .... ."); Michael
C. Blumm &
Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARiZ. L. REV. 701,
713 (1995)
('The trust doctrine's common law origins can, in fact, be traced back to medieval England and ultimately
to Roman
law. Consequently, there are sound historical and conceptual reasons for grounding the public trust in common
law."
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'
189
and consequently the shores of the sea" are "common to [all] mankind." One
scholar describes this commons approach as: :

Roman law did not distinguish among the many forms of fresh water in
nature: clouds, rain, diffused surface water, stream flow, river underflow,
percolating groundwater, vapor, lakes, flood water, seepage, etc. Because
of the fugitive and fluctuating character of water in its natural state,
in water
of property
existence
the
denied
law
Roman
and
altogether- including running water-and held the use of rivers
19
and the air.
sea
the
like
everyone,
of
right
common
the
lakes to be

The Code thus made clear that the public has a common right to "running water"
9
have a right and interest to use
generally-separate from an interest in the sea.' ' All
192
flowing water, whether that be "rivers" or "ports."' Even prior to193that, in ancient
China, there was a strong recognition of public interests in water. At the public
trust's true source, therefore, there is no clear distinction about the public's interest
in certain types of194water or uses of water-the public's interests is protected as to all
"flowing water."'

(footnote omitted)); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the
Guardianof the State'sNaturalResources, 16 DuKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 57,62-63 (2005); Cynthia L. Koehler,
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine:Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541,
544-45 (1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioningthe Public Trust Doctrine,71 IOWA L. REV. 631,633-34 (1986); Eric Nelson, The Public
Trust Doctrineand the GreatLakes: Glass v. Goeckel, 11 ALB. L. ENVTh. OUTLOOK J. 131,136-38 (2006); George
P. Smith 1I & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrineand NaturalLaw: Emanationswithin a Penumbra,
33 B.C. ENVrL AFF. L. REv. 307, 310-13 (2006); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A
ConservativeReconstruction& Defense, 15 SF- ENVrL. LJ. 47, 56-57 (2006).
189 J, INST. 2.1.1-4; see also Deveney, supranote 60, at 23 (quoting J. INST. 2.1.1-5).
'9 David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV.
461, 475 (2007); see also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) ("The first of mankind had in
common all those things which God had given to the human race. This community was not a positive
community of interest, like that which exists between several persons who have the ownership of a thing
in which each has his particular portion. It was a ... negative community, which resulted from the fact
that those things which were common to all belonged no more to one than to the others .... That which
fell to each one among them commenced to belong to him in private ownership, and this process is the
origin of the right of property. Some things, however, did not enter into this division, and remain therefore
to this day in the condition of the ancient and negative community. .... 'These things are those which the
jurisconsults called res communes .... the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its shores."'
(quoting R.J. Pothier's treatise on property)), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979);
Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 640 (1957).
See J. INST. 2.1.1.
'91
92
1 1d. at 2.1.1-2.
193 U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Asia and the Far East, Water Legislation in Asia and the Far East, Part 1,
U.N. Sales No. 67.II.F. 11, at 25-36 (1967) ("[P]rivate water ownership in China was never mentioned in
Chinese water laws until very recently, and [] everyone's compliance with their duties in the use,
distribution and control of water, and waterworks construction and maintenance would correspond to, and
enhance, the public welfare.").
194 Roman law did mention the importance of the public's ability to navigate on waterbodies, but there is no
suggestion that the use was meant as a limitation on the public's interests. See Kanner, supranote 188, at 63.
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There are many other pre-American hints that the true guiding principle of the
public trust is protection of a wide-ranging public interest in water.1 95 In the 1600s,
the Commonwealth of Oceana was published, a text that would prove pivotal in the
evolution of water-trust principles.19 6 This text emphasized that trust principles were
tethered to a fundamental public interest in the water resources held by the
government, not a particular type of body of water.' 97 Spanish and French law
98
agree.'
English common law, although sometimes offering conflicting descriptions of
the public right to water, often emphasized that the public interest stemmed from
flowing water:
[FIlowingwater is publicijuris,not in the sense that it is bonum vacans,
to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is

public and common in this sense only, that all may reasonably use it who
have a right of access to it, that none can have any property in the water
itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract
from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of
possession only.' 99
At the end of the American Revolution, public trust principles were incorporated
in Article III of the 1783 Peace Treaty between Britain and the United States, when
the parties "agreed[] [t]hat the People of the United States shall continue to enjoy
unmolested the Right to take Fish" and "also on the Coasts, Bays and Creeks of all
other of His Britannick Majesty's Dominions in America.""°
In early America, courts consistently characterized the public trust as protecting
the public's interest in water at large-since the very earliest adoptions of the
doctrine. 20 1 Take Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,20 2 the single most
influential public trust case in U.S. history. 203 Illinois had attempted to transfer a big
chunk of the Lake Michigan shoreline to a private company for economic
development. 2' The Supreme Court struck down the giveaway of water resources
based on the public trust doctrine, holding that a state cannot divest itself of these
195See MARC BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY: AN ESSAY ON ITS BASIC
CHARACTERISTICS 183
(Janet Sondheimer trans., 1966); MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A
SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 1550-1850 117-19 (1984); see also JAMES HARRINGTON,
THE COMMONWEALTH

OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 171 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992) ("As an estate in trust
becomes a

man's own if he be not answerable for it, so, the power of a magistracy not accountable unto the people
from whom it was received becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty.").
196Robert G. Natelson, The Constitutionand the Public Trust, 52 BUFFALO L. REv. 1077, 1111-12
(2004); see generally HARRINGTON, supra note 195.
97
' See generallyHARRINGTON, supra note 195.
198See BLOCH, supra note 195, at 183; MEYER, supranote 195, at 117-19.
'99Embrey v. Owen (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585; 6 Ex. 353, 369 (emphasis added).

200The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between His Britannick Majesty
and the United
States of America, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 111, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
201See, e.g., I11.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (referring to the right at issue as
"the interest of the public in [] waters").
202 See generally id.

203Lazarus, supra note 188, at 640.
2
04See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 433-34.
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Indeed, the Court's premise for expanding the definition of navigability (and thus
be
expanding the waters covered by the doctrine) was that the public trust should
212
The
waterbodies.
its
and
States
based on the current "condition" of the United
Supreme Court thus hints that the public trust's definition turns on a flexible analysis
of the condition-or need-of the public interest.
Over a decade later, Justice Holmes made this fundamental notion of public
interest in water more explicit:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows.... The private right to appropriate is subject.., to the
diminish one of the great
initial limitation that it may not substantially
213
foundations of public welfare and health.
Courts have historically stepped in to eradicate water rights to support the
"public interest." For example, in UnitedStates v. Rio GrandeDam & IrrigationCo.,
River
2 14
the U.S. Supreme Court prevented the complete diversion of the Rio Grande
interests in water.
public
important
with
interfere
would
it
because
in New Mexico
Another illustrative case is a Minnesota Supreme Court case from the late 1800s,
215 The court called out other judges for suggesting that the
Lamprey v. Metcalf
201
206

Id. at 435, 463-A4 (emphasis added).
See id.at 433-63.

207

Id.

201
209

Id. at 452-453.
Id. at 436.

210

id.

211

Id. at 452-53.

2 12

See id. at 436.

213 Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
see also Cal.
214 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 696, 703 (1899);
(1935).
158-59
142,
U.S.
295
Co.,
Cement
Portland
Or. Power Co. v. Beaver
21153 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893).
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touchstone for all public trust duties is whether waterways can support
commerce: "we fail to see why [noncommercial waters] ought not to be held to be
public waters, or navigable waters. ' 21 6 Highlighting the basic public-interest
principle that animates public trust principles, the court reasoned: "we do not see
why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as
boating for mere pecuniary profit. ' 217 Over the last hundred years, many courts have
echoed this sentiment, defining the scope of public trust by looking to various public
21 8
interest considerations.
Likewise, the public trust has extended to non-commerce uses since its early
conceptions. The most obvious examples are hunting and fishing. 219 Courts have not
generally required that plaintiffs prove that their use of water or wild game was for
"commercial" purposes. 2 2' As early as the late 1800s, courts
were protecting
recreational uses like boating and bathing. 22'
True, cases, including Illinois Central,have often discussed the public's interest
in navigating water or using water for commercial purposes and referred to state
title-but given the historical context, it makes much more sense that these were
simply the particular interests that members of the public were pressing at the time,
222
which we will turn to next.
B. That the public trust doctrine is based on protecting wholesalepublic interests
in all waters aligns with its history: it has evolved to meet changing
threats to water resources at large.
So we have this longtime recognition that the public-current and future-has a
fundamental interest and right to water. And we have a response: this trust principle
that requires governments to protect the public's interests and rights. One might
expect that the contours of the public trust would thus reflect the threat to the public's
2 16

Id. at 1143.
Id.
218 See, e.g., People ex rel.Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451-53 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); Hillebrand
v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937); Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 800 (S.D. 1915); see also
Mineral Cty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 808-09 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) ("If the current law
governing the water engineer does not clearly direct the engineer to continuously consider in the course
of his work the public's interest in Nevada's natural water resources, then the law is deficient. It is then
appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly reaffirm the engineer's continuing responsibility
as a public trustee to allocate and supervise water rights so that the appropriations do not 'substantially
impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.' . . . '[T]he public trust is more than
an
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of
the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering
that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.' Our dwindling natural resources deserve no less." (footnotes omitted)); Lawrence
v. Clark
2 1 9 Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 611 (Nev. 2011) (quoting Justice Rose's concurrence approvingly).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,533-34(1896), overruledby Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
220 See, e.g., id. at 530.
221E.g., Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143-44.
222See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); see also
JAMES RASBAND ET
AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 384-85 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing that water is generally
a
public resource that is uncapable of being owned in its natural state).
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interest in water at large-as the threat grows, so does the reach and force of the
state's trust obligations.
And it turns out, in broad strokes, that this relationship indeed explains the
evolution of the trust doctrine in the United States. Courts have been notoriously
confusing about the contours of the trust-both about what waters it covers and what
uses it protects. 223 But there is an unmistakable progression in lockstep through the
evolution of the doctrine. As threats to water have increased in number and kind, the
public trust has usually expanded to keep pace.
In early America, particularly in the East before the Western Expansion-where
water resources were plentiful and the threats to them few-the public trust doctrine
rights and interests in water
served a relatively narrow role. After all, the public's
224
We had not yet realized the
faced very different threats than those faced today.
nature of threats imposed by overdrawing our water resources, much less climate
change. The public's interest in water centered on travel and fishing: "waterways
transportation arteries of early days, and for fishing, an important
being the principal
225
food.of
source
This meant that large, arterial waterways were what concerned people, and their
government:
In an era before widespread highways and railroads, the farms and
industries of the Midwest poured their goods downriver to markets around
the world. The boomtowns of the century-New Orleans, St. Louis,
Cincinnati, and many others-thrived and grew on this waterborne
that the nation began building
commerce. Waterways were so
226valuable
them. The Erie Canal was one.
227
Large waterways of commerce were clogged with traffic. This was a problem
228
So, like England, the brunt of early America's use
that England had faced as well.
to major "navigable" waterways that were
related
was
doctrine
trust
public
the
of
22
' 9
Our ports were where trade happened; major rivers
"highways of commerce."
23 0
And so all of the early caselaw was concerned
were America's transport hubs.
with (1) major navigable waterways and (2) uses related to navigation and

commerce.

23

1

supra note 222, at 384-85 (discussing the changes and confusion surrounding
the public trust doctrine in relation to wildlife).
America.
224This is reflective of the nation's interests during eighteenth and early nineteenth century
navigation's
of
importance
the
(noting
(1827)
446-47
419,
Wheat.)
(12
U.S.
25
See Brown v. Maryland,
role in commerce to early America).
(N.J. 1972).
225 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 52
SMITHSONIAN
226 On The Water-Inland Waterways, 1820-1940: River Towns, River Networks,
4
_4.html
http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/
HISTORY,
OF
MUSEUM
223 Cf RASBAND ET AL.,

NAT'L

[https://perma.cc/P4FQ-N7PZ].
227 See Wilkinson, supranote 26, at 437 (discussing the importance of navigation on major bodies of
water in early America).
221 See id at 430-31.

430, 433, 447-48 n.95.
230 See id at 426, 434-35, 437.
231See supraPart I.
229Id. at
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Tellingly, the very early historic caselaw is relatively silent on any concerted
efforts to protect other non-commercial or non-navigable public interests in water.2 32
And that silence is telling. The interests motivating challenges usually concerned
individuals who wanted to commercially fish or commercially navigate water. 233
Later, it was commercial mining, then agriculture. 4 This was true prior to
America's adoption of the doctrine as well.235
The best view of this evolution may thus be one of practicalities: the nature of
the threats to the public's interests in water were largely commercial and involved
large waterways, so the caselaw developed to pay particular attention to commercial
interests early in its evolution. 236 Waterbodies were not so inundated with uses that
members of the public's aesthetic or other interests in water were seriously
threatened, or at least not to the extent that they are today. 237 Commerce happened to
be the public's main interest in water that was in jeopardy in these historical periods,
so these interests were litigated regularly. 238 A lack of standing to sue for other
interests may have also contributed. 9
None of this is to suggest that there is no caselaw or authority suggesting that a
touchstone of the public trust doctrine is commercial navigability or state title to
beds, surely there is. The point is that this story does not align with either the
fundamental theory of the public trust-which does not emerge from commerce, but
water itself-nor with how courts have treated the public trust in non-commercial
contexts over the last 100 years.
If you accept that the public trust stems from the public conferring wholesale
natural rights to water to their government, then as explained next, the constitutional
rationale of this doctrine starts to become clear.
C. The doctrine is aboutprotectingpublic rights vis-a-vis the government,
thus, it is constitutionalinforce.
The public trust doctrine does not appear in the text of the U.S. Constitution.24 °
Nor does it expressly appear in most state constitutions. 24 1 Many courts have called
the public trust a "common law" rule, and indeed, its application and evolution
232 Caselaw is rife with examples of commercial challenges related to public trust principles,
but
largely silent otherwise. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420,445 (1837); WIEL,
supra note 179, at 11-12 (reviewing various commercial disputes over water).
233See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 1-2, 8 (N.J. 182 1) (addressing commercial oyster farming).
23
4 See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition,56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317,318-20 (1985).
235 See Natelson,supra note 196, at 1087 (explaining how the founders viewed a fiduciary
government).
236In other words, I suggest the more sensible interpretation of the caselaw in the precise opposite of
scholars like Maureen E. Brady-who suggests that the public trust was only ever protecting federal or
other interests in commerce. See Brady, supra note 175, at 1419.
237See supra Section II.A (discussing evolution of threats to water resources in America).
238See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
239 Standing to sue for public interests in resources has only developed
in recent decades. See

Turnipseed et al., supra note 89, at 13, 51-53 (discussing the changes surrounding standing in the context
of the public trust doctrine).
21 See McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24, at 60-61.
241 See, e.g., ARiZ. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
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242
The doctrine has evolved over time, case by case, and
appear common-law-like.
243
call it a common law rule. As mentioned in prior
decisions
some of the earliest
of
sections, early American courts often framed the public trust in terms
attendant
water that came with an
property: when states owned beds underneath
2
obligation to care for the water above them. " And the true source of the public trust
has been a hot topic in water law scholarship and jurisprudence for quite some

time.

24 5

But on balance, given the prior section's conclusion that the public trust protects
public interests and rights in water--coupled with the weight of historic and legal
authority-the true source of the public trust doctrine is constitutional.
i.History suggests that the public trust doctrine reflects a basic constitutional or
sovereign limitation on government authority.
can abrogate the public
Under the purely common-law view, state legislatures
2 46
courts similarly can
And
rule.
law
common
any
trust, just as they can abrogate
247
the best evidence
out,
turns
it
as
But
nonexistence.
into
trust
interpret the public
sovereignty and
of
notions
fundamental
in
roots
doctrine's
trust
public
points to the
248
principles and
trust
of
role
the
is
evidence
that
of
Some
principles.
constitutional
249
Given
authority.
what those principles reflect-namely, a limitation on sovereign
general
conferring
public
that we have seen how the trust doctrine derives from the
government, a constitutional source of the doctrine
rights to flowing water on the
250
conclusion.
seems a foregone
"The Social Contract theory, which heavily influenced Thomas Jefferson and
other Founding Fathers, provides that people possess certain inalienable lights and
of
that governments were established by consent of the governed for the purpose
251
limited
securing those rights." ' Trust principles are fundamental to our system of a
government-and they reflect a basic restraint on sovereign authority that is
See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp.
by the Clean
2d 11, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that that the public trust doctrine can be displaced
Said than
Easier
Wood,
John
60;
at
24,
note
supra
Slater,
Air Act); see also McGlothlin &
41 ENVTL. L. REP.
Done: DisplacingPublic Nuisance When States Sue for Climate Change Damages,
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10316, 10321 (2011).
243 See McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24, at 58-61.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892).
244 See, e.g., 11.
the public trust
245 See generally McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24 (arguing against the use of
doctrine because of its irregular development).
246 See Brady, supra note 175, at 1433, 1440 (criticizing the contention that the public trust comes
Law, 89
from any constitutional principles); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon
HARV.L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1975).
247 See Brady, supra note 175, at 1433 (arguing that judges did not view the Constitution as a limit
on their authority in relation to navigability).
248 See Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The FederalPublic Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting
the doctrine
JusticeKennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 411,419 (2015) (describing
state's reserved powers).
a
of
part
and
sovereignty
in
as inherent
249
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVL GOVERNMENT. SECOND TREATISE 102,184 (Gateway 1955) (1690).
250 See supra Section III.A.
251 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016).
242
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constitutional at least in force. 2 The public trust doctrine is analogous to the many
trust principles baked into our U.S. Constitution and sovereign structure.
The seminal Oceana text was published in the 1600s, a text that would prove
pivotal in the evolution of water-trust principles.2 13 This text emphasized that trust
principles reflect a limitationon government authority: "an estate in trust becomes a
man's own if he be not answerable for it, so, the power of a magistracy not
accountable unto the people from whom it was received becoming of private use, the
commonwealth loses her liberty. '254
In the late 1600s, Charles II granted a charter to the "Governor and Company of
the English colony of Connecticut, in New-England, in America."255 This
proclamation clarified that the grant was "upon trust, and for the use and benefit of
themselves, and their associates, freemen of the said colony, their heirs and
assigns" -in other words, the governor was to serve as trustees for current and future
2 56
members of the colonies.
John Locke's foundational Second Treatise on Civil Government analyzed public
trust principles at length, emphasizing that the government's trust duties reflect a
limitation on government authority vis-a-vis the people:
[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there
remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them; for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being
limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed,
the trust must necessarily be forfeited ....
257
Executive officers were also trustees: "The power of assembling and dismissing
the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it,
but is [a] fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people ....
2 58
At bottom, Locke was convinced that government trust principles reflect the
basic sovereign relationship between ruler and ruled: the trust's point is to prevent
governments from self-dealing or squandering resources-and puts the power of
enforcement in the hands of the people. 259 According to Locke, public officials
should not engage self-dealing:
[G]ovemment... being... entrusted with this condition, and for this
end, that men might have and secure their properties, the prince, or senate,

however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property

252 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947 (Pa. 2013)
(discussing state
constitution's limitation on government authority).
213Natelson, supra note 198, at 1111-12.
254HARRINGTON, supra note 195, at 171.
255 Charter of the Colony of Conn. (1662). The earlier charters of Virginia and
Massachusetts contain
no such trust language. See First Charter of Va. (1606); Second Charter of Va. (1609); Third
Charter of
Va. (1612); First Charter of Mass. (1629).
256 Charter of the Colony of Conn. (1662).
257LOCKE, supranote 249, at 124.
25
1d. at 129.
259 See id.at 116.
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between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to
take to themselves the whole or any part of the subject's property without
their own consent. For this would be in effect to leave them no property
at all.

26°

All this early focus on trust principles as fundamental limitations on governments

states went so far
carried over to the states at the founding of America. Indeed, many
2 61
example, the
For
constitutions.
their
in
principles
trust
as to incorporate express
follows:
as
states
constitution of Maryland
That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of
government are the trustees of the public, and, as such, accountable for
their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted,
and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress
and of right ought, to reform the old or
are ineffectual, the people may,
262
government
new
a
establish

limitation on
This concept of public trust principles acting as a fundamental
263
government authority is baked into the U.S. Constitution, as well. The Constitution
limits the legislature's powers to collect taxes by the "general [w]elfare" of the
public. 26 Although the Supreme Court has since interpreted this limitation broadly,
the phrase "general welfare" was meant to be a trust-related principle at the nation's
founding.265 Trust principles are part of other portions of the Constitution, too--like
266

the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Impeachment Clause.
History also suggests that protection of minority interests is essential to the
government's trust obligations. That is because fundamental to trust principles is the
duty of impartiality: a minority group's interests cannot give way to another's
interests just because it constitutes a bigger share--a trustee is trustee as to all
beneficiaries.

267

2

6 Id. at 116-17.
261See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XI, XV; MD. CONST. of 1776,
arts. XXXI, XXXII, XXXV, XXXIX, LII-LV; MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the Second, eh. VI, arts. I, II,
1777, art.
IX; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XII, XXXII; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; N.Y. CONST. of
XXXVI.
art.
XXXIII; S.C. CONST. of 1778,
262 MD. CONST. of 1776, art- IV.
id. art. VI, cl. 3.
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. VII; id. art. I, § 9, cl. VIII; id. art. II, § 1, cl. II;
264 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
265 See Natelson, supra note 196, at 1169 ("The Supreme Court... has ruled that the Clause grants
seen,
Congress open-ended authority to spend for what Congress deems the 'general welfare.' We have
with
associated
was
welfare'
'general
phrase
the
adopted,
was
Constitution
the
time
the
at
however, that
a trust-style restriction on government power."); see also Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
An Essay in OriginalUnderstanding,52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (2003).
Clause and the Public Trust: 196,
at 1171-74.
266 Natelson, supra note
267 See NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
WITH ANSWERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA:
20 (1787); Letter from James
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED AGAINST THE SYSTEM

that
Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787) (on file with the Library of Virginia) (suggesting
granting monopolies would be a breach of trust and outside of Congress's enumerated powers).

2019-2020

A NEW WATER LAW VISTA

Trust principles as applied to our government have always been categorized as

constitutional, so it follows that the public trust doctrine is, too.
The very nature of the public trust doctrine reveals that it has always operated
and been intended to operate as a reflection of sovereign authority over water. Illinois

Central made these limitations clear.268 The U.S. Supreme Court has never suggested
that legislatures can abdicate public trust duties-indeed, in Illinois Central,it said
the opposite.269 And given that the Court there never once mentioned Illinois law, it
could not have been operating on the presumption that Illinois was silent about

whether it wanted to be bound by the trust's limitations.

The public trust doctrine's similarity to constitutional police powers is also
telling. The Supreme Court made this connection itself in Illinois

Central:"[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, .. . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration

of government and the preservation of the peace."27
The reserved powers doctrine confirms this view: the Supreme Court has
recognized that this doctrine prevents legislatures from abdicating sovereign
authority-and a line of authority applying this doctrine was cited in Illinois

Central.271 As explained later, the reserved powers doctrine also supports a Due

Process source for the public trust. 272 Similar to the reserved powers doctrine, a long
line of cases (dating back to English common law) holds that legislatures cannot bind
future sitting legislatures, which suggests that no legislature can constitutionally
273
abdicate trust responsibilities.

Courts have often expressly recognized the inherent sovereign limitations

imposed by the public trust doctrine.274 Justice Douglas in Palmer v. Thompson
261See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435,457-58 (1892).
269

d.at 453.

170Id. at 453.
271See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996); Ilt. Cent.
R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453,

459 (discussing Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548 (1879) and noting "that there could be
no contract and
no irrepealable law upon governmental subjects... that every succeeding legislature possesses
the same
jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have the same power of repeal
and modification
which the former had of enactment ... and that a different result would be fraught with
evil"); see also
Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. at 559 (recognizing the reserved powers doctrine and
explaining that
"[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect
to them as its
predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the
former had of
enactment, neither more nor less").
272See infra Section lII.C.ii.
273See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 721-22
(Cal. 1983). The case
discusses the concept that "trusts by which the property was held by the State can be resumed
at anytime."
Id.(quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455-56). This concept, however, dates back
much farther.
274
See, e.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa,
972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz.
1999) (explaining that the doctrine is a constitutional limitation on the legislature); In re
Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (noting that the doctrine comes from
inherent sovereign
authority); Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (noting that the "doctrine
arises from
the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power"); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth,
83 A.3d 901,
948 (Pa. 2013) (saying that the public trust rights are preserved rather than created
by the state
constitution); see also Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading
Schemes: A
SustainableMiddle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 311 (2010) ("Public trust principles
have been
described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across cultures and across millennia."
(footnotes
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include water.275
advocated that the rights protected by the Ninth Amendment should
Township
Robinson
is
point
this
on
cases
thorough
But one of the most
276 The Court explained that the public trust derives from "the
v. Commonwealth.
concept that certain rights are inherent to mankind, and thus are secured rather than
pedigree in
bestowed by the Constitution" and that this principle "has a long
2 '77
International
Republic."
the
of
Pennsylvania that goes back at least to the founding
2 78
Other courts and
law supports this constitutional or sovereign source as well.
of the public
notion
sovereign
fundamental
the
have long emphasized
commentators 279
doctrine.
trust
The public trust doctrine, therefore, makes most sense as a trust limitation on
sovereign authority: a reflection of the government's limited rights to interfere with
the public's interest in water resources. Like other trust principles underpinning U.S.
sovereignty and the Constitution's writing, the public trust doctrine is fundamental.
be bound by the public
Under this view, both the state and federal government28would
°
rights.
trust. After all, both are limited by the public's
ii. The best theoretical (and practical) home for the doctrine sits
in the due process clause.
Acknowledging that the public trust doctrine stems from constitutional and
sovereign limitations on the government is an important first step. But we need some
more flesh on those bones. What are the character of those limitations?
Scholars who agree that there is a constitutional or fundamental sovereign hook
to the doctrine have proposed a few sources. Those include the Commerce Clause,
the Due Process Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the Union Clause"
is protecting the public's
(among others). 281' But given that the doctrine's core tenet
282
and the public trust's
flexibility,
intrinsic
its
rights,
water
in
broad interest
similarity to police powers and its focus on the public's concrete rights to water
resources-the Due Process Clause makes particular sense.
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
omitted)); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law's DNA,

POL'Y 281, 291-92 (2014).
275 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
276
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948-49.
277Id. at 948 n.36 (quoting Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208 (Pa. 2013)).
Trust
278 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizingthe Public
the Saxion Vision, 45
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutionaland Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling
(2012).
741
REV.
L.
DAVIS
U.C.

279 See, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (saying
jus publicum);
neither the federal nor state governments can convey trust lands free of the sovereign's
supra note 277.
280 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 248, at 411 (describing the doctrine as inherent in sovereignty
and part of the state's reserved powers).
Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
28' Cf William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive
of the public trust
source
legal
the
determining
of
importance
the
REV. 693, 711 (2012) (discussing
doctrine); Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 713-15.
282 "One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to
words, more or less
substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or
flexible...." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965).
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The Due Process Clause incorporates unenumerated rights against the federal and
state governments.283 Whether a particular unenumerated right or limitation qualifies
depends on "whether the right... is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty
or... whether this right is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' ' 284
When identifying fundamental rights that merit protection under substantive due
process, courts look to tradition and the nation's history. 285
Importantly, the Supreme Court has had no trouble recognizing new fundamental
rights when evolving threats to our rights manifest themselves. As Justice Kennedy
explained in the Obergefell v. Hodges decision:
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights .. .did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so
they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.2 86
As explained above, overwhelming authority recognizes a public interest and
right in water that predates America's founding.287 That this right is important is hard
to argue.288 Many states themselves have declared public interests and rights in
water. 289 These concrete, tangible expectations in public water interests predate
290
America's founding.
Since the earliest conceptions of the doctrine, courts have named these rights as
a public "ownership" or "title" in water. 291 Although a true ownership theory in the
simple property sense has been debunked, this property language reinforces the
principle that the public has concrete, protectable interests in water resources. 29 2
Perhaps most telling is that courts have widely agreed that the public trust doctrine
confers standing. 293 The Supreme Court has not yet expressly recognized
fundamental rights to water resources, but it has been inching closer in its standing
294
cases.

In the past, there was little need to recognize that the Due Process Clause protects
the public's interests in natural water, but that does not mean the protections were
283 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing the unenumerated right
of privacy).
284 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (citation omitted).
285See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S.
1, 12 (1967).
286 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
287 See supra Section III.A.

218See generally Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 248.
289Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 178-79 (comparing state proclamations on water
ownership).

290 See Donna Jalbert Patalano, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive
Zoning through the
Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REV.683, 705A06 (2001).

291See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457-58 (1892) (noting that
the state holds
title to resources for the public).
292 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 184-86.

E.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (111.1970); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State,
Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Alaska 2014).
294 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52
(1972).
293
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not there. As threats to water resources have reached a peak, "we learn
295
[the Constitution's] meaning" in this space.
The due process theory dovetails nicely with the Ninth Amendment, too. That
is a
the public has unalienable rights that the government cannot infringe upon
296
After
Amendment.
backdrop to the Constitution, as well as the basis for the Ninth
all: "[The Ninth Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential
rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial
'297
The public right to water fits the definition of an
that others were protected.
"essential" right that did not-at the time of the founding perhaps-warrant
enumeration. But those rights are no less effective and no less protectable under Due
Process.
A Due Process or sovereignty principle makes particular sense given the limiting
nature of the public trust doctrine. After all, the doctrine is29a8 "trust"--it has always
could
the sovereign
9
been a limitation on what sovereigns can do with resources. Ifthe
doctrine. 29
to
force
little
be
would
there
whim,
a
on
shed its trustee duties
The public trust's similarity to state's police powers (in conjunction with the
Central
reserved powers doctrine) also supports the Due Process view. The Illinois300
Both
powers.
police
state's
a
to
doctrine
trust
public
the
compared
court explicitly
30 1
And
citizens.
doctrines also stem from the relationship between states and their
Process
Due
the
courts frequently consider challenges to police powers under
Clause.

302

Process of elimination is also helpful. The main alternative constitutional home
for the public trust doctrine is the Commerce Clause. But for one, the Commerce
Clause butts up against the consistent mandate that state law defines the contours of
the public trust doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court explained in PPL
Montana,LLC v. Montanathat "the contours of [the] public trust do not depend upon
the Constitution" because "[u]nder accepted principles of federalism, the States
retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within
their borders. '3°3 This language suggests that the federal Commerce Clause is not the
real source of the doctrine. The Commerce Clause would also suggest that the public
relationship between the federal government and the
trust doctrine concerns the
3 4
0
has.
never
it
states-and
The Due Process Clause fits much better on this point. If the doctrine stems from
the government protecting public interests-and those public interests turn on the
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See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Id.
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298See supra Section I1l.C.i.
299
See infra Part V.

'00Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453,459 (1892).

301Compare Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 397 (1926) (describing the due
process relationship), with Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.
at 386-87.
302 E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,541-42 (2005); Viii. of Euclid,272 U.S.
303PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012).
304 See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An
Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 113, 134-35 (2010).
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nature of state waters themselves-then it would make sense that state law, not
federal law, governs the initial question (with federal public trust law, as I will
explain later, playing a role in addressing remedies).30 5
The recent case of Juliana v. United States signals a potential sea change in
courts' appetite for recognizing substantive due process claims based on the public's
collective interest in natural resources. 306 Juliana has been called "the most
important lawsuit on the planet right now. '30 7
In Juliana, twenty-one young people, ranging in age from eight to nineteen,
alleged, among other things, that the federal government violated its public trust
duties by failing to stop climate change. 3 8 The plaintiffs called for the government
to "phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric
[carbon dioxide]."30 9 Their theory was that the government has infringed their
fundamental rights by allowing climate change to run rampant. 310
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to a stable
climate.311 The court also held that the public trust doctrine applied, based on the
theory that the federal government had abdicated its duties over the tidal lands it
owns (not its or the states' duties over water).312 The court analyzed and rejected the
argument of whether the political question doctrine prevents courts from recognizing
these public trust rights.3 13 But as we will see, the political question doctrine is
entirely inapplicable given that the point of the public trust doctrine is to limit the
political branches' powers.314
The Juliana decision, and its reception, signals a growing acceptance of
challenges based on the public's interests in natural resources. The Court's reliance
on the Due Process Clause is in line with the constitutional underpinnings suggested
in this article.
But the strong opposition that has met the Juliana case tees up an important
problem of scope: if everyone has a generalized fundamental right to natural
resources, are there no limits on challenges to environmental challenges?31 5 Indeed,
courts are already inundated with challenges under federal statutes like the National
3 16
Environmental Policy Act.

305 But that would not prevent one from challenging a deprivation of Due Process
under the U.S.

Constitution. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435.
306 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D.
Or. 2016).
M7 Press Release, Our Children's Trust, Judge Coffin to U.S. Government:
'Are You Robbing Peter
to Pay Paul?' (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/press-releases [https://perma.cc/389TRWXL] (quoting Bill McKibben and Naomi Klein) (scroll down and click on the release's hyperlink).
30
8 Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-34.
309
Id. at 1239.
31
See id. at 1233.
311
312 Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1256-61.
313 See infra Part IV.
3 14

See infra Part IV.

315The Julianacourt attempted

to cabin its decision by narrowing its decision to climate change, which presents
an unusually dangerous threat to resources. See Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250,1265-67.
316See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1213-14 (9th Cir. 2008).
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The Juliana court also went much farther than recognizing that the public trust
over water is rooted in the U.S. and state constitutions and fundamental notions of
state sovereignty-which allows both federal and state courts to determine the reach
of the doctrine, as this article proposes. Instead, Juliana recognized a basic
fundamental right to a stable climate under the Due Process Clause, predicated on a
3 17
It also grounded these rights in federal
generalized harm to the environment.
to members of the public seeking to
help
land-ownership, which would be of little
state waters where there is no land
additional
to
duties
enforce the states' public trust
hook.
ownership
Before leaving this section, a couple counterpoints to a constitutional framework
should be aired. The public trust doctrine is unique in that it protects public interests,
not private ones. The doctrine's purpose is to craft a means for challenging the state's
abdicating of its authority. So, the existing substantive Due Process framework is not
implicated.

318

of times now,
A final counterpoint is that the U.S. Supreme Court has, a couple
'3 19
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law."
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At
all.
at
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can't
Constitution
U.S.
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that this implies that
taken
actually
never
has
Court
Supreme
The
dicta.
best,
at
are,
this
statements like
up the question of whether the public trust doctrine is solely a matter of state law.
Nor could it: no accepted case has presented the question whether a state has
abdicated its sovereign duties by infringing on the public's general interest in water.
the Supreme Court
That is, except Illinois Central. And recall, in Illinois Central,
320
law.
Illinois
to
cite
single
a
without
trust
enforced the public
But more importantly, there are several reasons that these dicta statements are
consistent with a constitutional view of the public trust doctrine. For one, as we have
seen, state law is central to the public trust doctrine, because it is the states who hold
32 1
It is also state sovereignty duties
most of the water potentially subject to the trust.

that are enforced under the public trust doctrine. And, so, we look to state law to
determine whether certain waters have been accepted into that trust and whether the
trust has been breached. But that does not mean that the federal courts cannot play a
role in determining when states have abdicated their sovereign duties by infringing
upon the public's right to water (which can, eventually, deprive the public of their
fundamental rights to water).
For another, state constitutions usually contain due process clauses, which form
an additional check on the states' abdication of their water-trust duties .322 Thus, even
if the public trust doctrine were a matter of "state law," that would not undermine

31 7

Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248-50.

See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712, 721 (Cal. 1983)
(discussing the "public interest" protected by the doctrine).
319E.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372 (1977).
320 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
321See supra Sections III.A-B.
s ver
322
See, e.g., Zachary Bray, Texas Groundwater and TragicallyStable "Croso s, "2014 BYU L. REV. 1283,
1295, 1306-07 (discussing the addition of the "Conservation Amendment" to Texas's constitution).
311
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the theory that the doctrine reflects a limit on sovereign authority vis-a-vis the
citizenry.
With the doctrine fimnly rooted in constitutional principles, particularly the Due
Process Clause, the question is: so what?
IV. WHEN COURTS FIND THAT A STATE INFRINGES THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN
WATER, EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST'S REACH IS THE REMEDY
-AND A JOB FOR THE JUDICIARY ALONE.

A. Interpretingwhen states exceed their authorityand infringe on the public's
general right to water is a uniquejobfor the judiciary
With the public trust doctrine firmly entrenched in constitutional and sovereign
principles, the judiciary's role becomes clear. The public trust doctrine simply
reflects the states' limited authority over water vis-a-vis the people. When states
allow too much water to be privatized or harmed, thus infringing on the public
interest, those states have exceeded their authority. And interpreting the bounds of
that authority is a classic judicial function--both state and federal.
Like the interpretation of any other constitutional doctrine, this is a job for the
courts alone. 323 Although this means that legislative and executive decisions about
water can be overruled, that is proper. After all: "while democracy may seem
subverted when a court overrules the acts of elected officials, such judicial acts in
fact serve democracy by preserving rights invested in all the people."324 "Courts act
as 'an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.' 3 25
"Because the duty to 'say what the law is' is vested entirely and exclusively in the
judicial branch, the Court has made plain that Congress may not interfere with the
federal courts' independent process of adjudication and interpretation. '32 6
First, interpreting the public trust doctrine is at the core of judicial function.3 27
Following prior sections above, courts are merely redressing the wrong of states
infringing on the public interest in water.3 28 The application of the public trust
doctrine has been the job of the judiciary since its inception.3 29 The judiciary's role
makes sense when you remember that the public trust is about protecting tangible

323 This is not a controversial point Alexander Hamilton famously said that "[tjhe interpretation
of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province ofthe courts"-and tat has remained the case. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
135
S. CL 1199, 1217 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
324 David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine,Environmental Human Rights, and
the Futureof Private
Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 715 (2008).
31 Perez, 135 S.Ct. at 1219 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
326Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
327 See id. at 1264 ("[T]he federal courts are charged with interpreting the Constitution
and ensuring
that the statutory law is consistent with it-a determination that is, in the words of Chief Justice
John
Marshall, the 'very essence of judicial duty."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803))).
328 See supra Part III.
329 See supra Part I.
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Second, separation of powers principles dictate that the judiciary alone must be
the final arbiter of the reach of the public trust doctrine--and thus the limits of the
other branches' authority vis-a-vis the people. "[E]ver since Marbury," the Supreme
33
' 1
Court "has remained the ultimate expositor of the [C]onstitution[]."
"Many decisions . . . have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v.
Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
332
And the public trust doctrine requires us to consider the
say what the law is."'
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appropriate role of the
to water.
known
Separation of powers is fundamental to our system of government, 333
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That's because, as explained above, the public trust doctrine at its heart is a
reflection of the limitations placed on states in harming the water resources that the
the keys to the limits of
public entrusted to them. To give the state political branches
336
itself.
limitation
the
their own powers would undermine
Third, the reserved powers doctrine further supports the judiciary's role. Under
this theory, powers not expressly or impliedly given to the government are retained
by the people. 337 In addition to this doctrine, it has been recognized that powers
conferred to the state "can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and [are]
'338
When one accepts that the public's interest in
inalienable by express grant."."
water as a whole was conferred in trust on the states, the reserved powers doctrine
requires that states not abdicate that right. And the judiciary is in the best position to
determine that question.
One follow-up question is: whose separation of powers, state or federal? The
answer is likely both. State constitutions typically provide for the same tripartite
339
structure as at the federal level. And scholars have explained at length why state
separation of powers principles are just as supportive of a limited legislative and
0 See, e.g., Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic PropertyRights: The Public Trust
Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 83-85 (2011).

...United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
332 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (citation omitted).
333 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1996).
134 Id. at 757.

335 E.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. CL ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz.
Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168-69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
1999);
3 36 Ariz.

SeeNORMAN SINGER& SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3:4(7th ed. 2018).

Q. 201, 201-03 (1915).
338 See Atd. Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
317 Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI.

CONST. art. VI, § 1; NEB.
339 E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 1; id. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; id. art. V, § 4; ILL.
CONST. art. V, § 1; id. art. III, § 1; id. art. IV, § 6.
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executive branch as the federal government are-regardless of whether particular
states have constitutionally instituted express separation of powers principles.34 ° And
when the public's fundamental rights to water are infringed, the U.S. and state
constitutions are implicated. So, challenges in either court should be proper.
One obvious counter is that public rights are typically protected through the
political process, not the judicial one.341 Public right cases are often dismissed on
political question grounds or as general grievances.342 But the political question
doctrine should be no barrier to the view that the reach of the public trust doctrine is
constitutional and the province of the courts. This doctrine instructs that certain
questions should be left to the political branches of government. 343 The doctrine is a
narrow one.3" The core factors are (1) a commitment of the question to a non-judicial
branch of government; (2) a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving an
issue; and (3) the impossibility of deciding the dispute without a policy choice clearly
appropriate for non-judicial discretion. 34 5
At the outset, interpretation of the bounds of the public trust doctrine is an
interpretation of the political branches' powers-not traditionally a political
question. 346 Interpreting whether and when states have violated their constitutional
or sovereign duties does not touch on the sorts of political questions this doctrine is
concerned about." 7 Instead, interpreting whether the other branches have exceeded
their powers is at the heart of the judicial role. 348 As demonstrated in the Juliana
decision: determining the remedy to redress harm is the judiciary's function. 349 And
as the Ninth Circuit recently explained: claiming that review of legislative or
340 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:
Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 395-96; see also Dodd, supra note 337, at 203-04.
311See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
342See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968). The standard, however, has varied considerably
over time. Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669,
688-90 (1973), with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 502 (1975) (discussing standard in different
terms).
343Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case held
to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.").
3
See id at 217.
345id.

34 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (noting that courts should adjudicate disputes in a "form
historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process").
147 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d
901, 927-28 (Pa. 2013).
141 Cf Lynn S. Schaffer, Pulledfrom Thin Air: The (Mis)Application
of Statutory Displacementto a
Public Trust Claim in Alec L. v. Jackson, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 192 (2015) ("The limits placed
on the sovereign body represent the true power of the trust, especially when the government violates
fiduciary
duties to protect trust property from impairment, damage, or waste.").
49
1 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1239
(D. Or. 2016). The court stated there that the
"plaintiffs do not ask this Court to pinpoint the 'best' emissions level; they ask this
Court to determine
what emissions level would be sufficient to redress their injuries. That question can be answered without
any consideration of competing interests." Id.
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B. The court's role in the public trust doctrine is best viewed as one of deciding
remedies: because courts are requiringstates to take trust duties over
the waters needed to redress a public wrong.
But saying that the judiciary can defeat legislative decisions with the public trust
is not enough. Because the more important question is: which aspects of the public
trust doctrine should the judiciary be interpreting and imposing on the other
branches?
We've seen that there are wide gaps in water resource management laws and,
despite some states' best efforts, the public trust doctrine.359 Many of these gaps, at
least when it comes to the public trust, are because of a misapprehension about where
the trust comes from-and, more importantly, where its limitations come from. Even
the state that clearly sits at the progressive end of the public trust spectrum,
California, still reasons that the reach of the public trust turns on historic concepts of
navigability, and that always, the ultimate definition of the public trust can be defined
by the other branches.36 °
In the historic Mono Lake decision, the California Supreme Court explained
en banc that the reach of the waters infused with public trust obligations turns on
historic concepts of navigation.36 ' More importantly, the court suggested that beyond
the traditional minimum, legislatures had the power to define the reach of the
doctrine, noting that the California legislature had "implicitly acknowledged"
expansions to the trust. 362 The problem remains more fundamental.
Some scholars and courts have already suggested that legislatures cannot
abdicate their public trust duties over a certain subset of waters,3 63 but as we have
seen that is of only limited use because states can simply narrow the scope of the
doctrine with impunity. 3" Instead, we should consider the view that the reach of the
public trust itself-in terms of which waters, which uses, and how effective-is a
constitutional question, too. This view makes sense because the public trust doctrine
is a means of determining when states have abdicated their constitutional duties by
failing to protect public water interests as a whole. To remedy those harms, states
will often need to take additional waters and uses into trust.
The judiciary's most important job should be interpreting what scope of public
trust obligations will satisfy the state's duties to protect the public interest in flowing

359 See supra Part II.

360 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709,
712 (Cal. 1983).
361Id True, California has reasoned that the doctrine can reach non-navigable
waters that affect
navigable ones-but the touchstone remains historic navigation. See id at 712, 720-21. The only reason
this was not an issue in the Mono Lake decision is that the lake was clearly navigable. Id. at 719.
362
Id. at 713.
363 E.g., Takacs, supra note 324, at 714-15 (citing the Illinois Central
Railroadcourt) ("While other
common law doctrines may be undone by explicit legislation, the Public Trust Doctrine seems sacrosanct,
holding a power beyond modification or revocation by legislative action."); see also James L. Huffman,
A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527,

565-68 (1989) (discussing how the public trust doctrine results in nondemocratic courts setting aside
decisions of democratic legislatures).
364 See Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 42, at 80-81.
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water as a whole. This follows if you accept the conclusions I've touched on in prior
sections:
First, we accept3 65that the public trust protects the public's basic
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In the public trust context, we effectively have states sitting on water and failing
to prevent them from being harmed. Courts are stepping in and imposing a
constructive trust on the state's water resources to redress this wrong or recognizing
a resulting trust inherent in the public's original conferring of its interests to the
states.37 ' Determining the bounds of what water assets need to be put into the trust is
a classic judicial function.
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Each of these determinations require courts to interpret the nature of the other
branches' obligations to protect public interests in water-and are thus well suited
for the courts.
V. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEwORK FOR THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

How might this all look in practice? Most importantly, this framework will plug
up the public trust holes that several states have created. This includes the legislative,
executive, and judicial holes. Because the courts are interpreting the boundaries of
sovereign authority,3 74 courts can no longer relegate the public trust to merely a
common law rule that can be overruled on a whim. Even better, the court's role
would now include interpreting the reach of the doctrine.
This version of the public trust doctrine is also simply more robust than others.
With the view that states have obligations to protect trust duties as to all flowing
waters-only at the point that public trust interests are seriously threatened-states
are not merely required to "consider" the public trust, instead, they are required to
375
preserve it.
Another key advantage is that if we recognize that the public interest and rights
in the entire corpus of flowing water predated our nation's founding-and that those
interests and rights were conferred in trust to the states-then challenges to state
water decisions under the Takings Clause will have less force.3 76
Other scholars and states have done admirable jobs at proposing how legislative
and executive branches should practically carry out their trust duties.3 7 7 Some
important fundamentals include requiring that every allocation of water touching on
judicially determined trust waters must include a public interest consideration.
Presumably, if courts determine that expanding public trust waters and uses is
warranted, then the public interest factor should be given extra, if not dispositive
weight in water management decisions. In other words, states act within their
constitutional authority only if they determine that the public interest is not impacted
by a particular water allocation.
Determining what waters need to be brought into the trust as a remedy for harms
to the public interest should be no problem for courts. Nor should determining when
states have failed to consider the right factors and thus abdicated their trust duties to

371 See supra Section III.C.ii.

375The problem is that the entire point of a trust is that the trustee cannot extinguish it. See
Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). And allowing states to merely "consider" the trust
undermines its constitutional and sovereign notion of limiting state authority to infringe on the public

interest. See supraSection III.C.i. But see John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrineas a Background

Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 951-55 (2012) (accurately
explaining the history of courts often recognizing that states need only consider the public trust interest).
...
See Peloso & Caldwell, supranote 330, at 83-85 (discussing how the public trust doctrine interacts
with takings law).
371 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, LegalAdaptive
Capacity:How Program
Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV.
711,

729-31 (2016).
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consider the public interest. 378 Courts conduct a similar analysis all the time under
various environmental statutes.379
This judicial-based approach will also free up courts in even the most progressive
states to further embrace the flexible public trust approach to water management.
That may be of some value. As mentioned above, the water crisis is quick-moving
and dire. A flexible public trust doctrine offers the adaptiveness states need to protect
law has a lot of
their diminishing water resources. The legislative approach to water
38 °
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fill.
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law character
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The Anglo-American common law system, for example, is in some ways
more procedurally adaptive than the legislative process. A common law
court has the capacity to distinguish previous cases when addressing new
factual circumstances. If Congress wants to amend a statute to address a
new situation not covered by existing law, or because changed
circumstances have undercut the effectiveness of existing law, it must
follow the constitutionally prescribed method for changing the
law-adoption of the same bill by both houses of Congress and either
presidential signature or legislative override of a presidential veto by a
38 2
two-thirds vote.

As Robin Craig explains at length, the shortcomings of many legislative 3answers
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to water law problems align quite nicely with a common law approach.
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384

*

*
*
*

needs;
The localized nature of water management
385
ever-changing;
are
The threats to water
is needed to find the best approaches to water
Experimentation
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387
A flexible common-law approach will allow the doctrine to evolve.

7 For states like Washington and Montana that have statutes requiring some form of environmental
impact assessment, it should be easy to add a public interest review. See States and Local Jurisdictions
with NEPA-like Environmental Planning Requirements, NAT'L ENVTL. POLICy ACT,
https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states.html [https://perma.cc/658A-XWGC].
"' See Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec'y of Dep't Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2012);
Suffolk Cty. v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1977); see also National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(h) (2018).
380 See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 377, at 729-30; J.B. Ruhl, GeneralDesign Principlesfor
Resilience andAdaptive Capacity in Legal Systems-With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,
89 N.C. L. REv. 1373, 1381-82 (2011).
31l See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 163, at 676-78; Craig, supra note 88, at 412-13.
382 Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 377, at 729; see also Ruhl, supra note 380, at 1381 (making
the same argument).
311 See Craig, supra note 105, at 80607.
384 See id. at 807.
311 Id. at 795 96.
386 See id. at 846-50.
387 id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

We should consider a framework that fully empowers the federal and state
judiciary to determine the scope of the public trust in all of our nation's waters. This
framework acknowledges the basic relationship between threats to water and the
contours of the public trust. When courts determine that the public's interest requires
an extension of trust obligations to a new set of waterways or uses-then it can say
so. The court is declaring the bounds of the state's authority over water. With those
boundaries set, the other branches decide what to do on the ground.
The implications for this framework are many. State courts can now extend the
reach and force of the public trust doctrine, even in the face of the political branches
refusing to act. As important, federal courts can enforce the public's right to water
to ensure that states protecting the public's basic rights to water. The public, in other
words, can hold its government accountable to the social contract it signed when the
nation was founded-a contract to protect the public's natural resources today and
for future generations.

